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1 Introduction
The world economy is characterized by vast cross-country income differences.
The economic development literature finds in many cases that sectoral com-
position differences contribute to income inequality across countries.1 In less
developed economies, agriculture accounts for a large share of production but,
at the same time, the importance of agriculture tends to decrease as the econ-
omy develops. Co´rdoba and Ripoll (1999) show that the fraction of the labor
force employed in agriculture is larger than the fraction of agriculture in to-
tal output in developing economies, indicating that labor productivity in non-
agricultural sectors is larger than in the agricultural sector. While neoclassical
theory has characterized sectoral composition as a byproduct of growth, a more
modern approach by Echevarria (1997) stresses the strong interrelationship be-
tween structural change and growth. As a result, structural change has received
a lot of attention in the development literature and in policy debates.
Herrendorf et al. (2013) define structural change as the reallocation of eco-
nomic activity across three broad sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and ser-
vices. In this paper, we focus on two tradable good sectors: agriculture and
manufacturing. Structural transformation is defined as industrialization when
factor inputs shift from the agricultural sector into the manufacturing sec-
tor. We follow Boldrin and Scheinkman (1988) and Lucas (1988) who use a
learning-by-doing externality in the manufacturing sector that increases total
factor productivity (TFP) growth the greater the output in that sector. In this
framework, industrialization is often seen as a necessary condition for economic
development.
Trade openness can have a fundamental impact on resource allocation across
sectors and determine the industrialization process of developing economies. Ac-
cording to Matsuyama (1992), closed economies with rich endowment of arable
land and natural resources generate more income than closed resource poor
economies. Due to non-homothetic preferences, the higher the level of real in-
come, the higher the relative demand for the manufactured good and, thus,
the more labor shifts into the manufacturing sector. The higher the output
of the manufactured good, the faster the rate of economic growth in the pres-
ence of production externalities in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, closed
economies with high agricultural TFP will tend to grow faster than closed
economies with low agricultural TFP. However, if agricultural TFP leads to
a comparative advantage in agriculture when a small economy opens up for
trade, labor will shift into the agricultural sector and economic growth declines.
The link between agricultural productivity and economic growth can become
1A large amount of of studies focus on finding the sources of the cross-country income
differences. Sachs and Warner (1999) and Gylfason et al. (2004) show that resource poor
economies tend to outperform resource-rich economies in terms of economic growth. Torvik
(2001) stresses that natural resource abundance may lower growth depending on the structure
of the economy. According to Wijnbergen (1984) and Krugman (1987) trade may shift factors
of production away from the pro-growth sector and reduce the rate of economic growth due
to natural resource abundance. We will assume in our model that resource abundance can
lead to higher initial agricultural TFP in an economy.
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negative for an open economy. As a result, developing countries that tend to
have a comparative advantage in agriculture can be better off without trade.
Nevertheless, recent research by Baldwin (2003) and Saure´ (2007) suggests that
trade is beneficial for developing economies.
The relationship between trade and growth is fundamentally ambiguous
(Grossman and Helpman (1991)) and merits further exploration. The objec-
tives of this paper are to find how industrial policy affects structural change
in a small open economy and how the trade-off between subsidy distortions,
dynamic gains from productivity growth and gains from trade affect welfare
in the long-run. We develop a two-sector growth model with a learning-by-
doing externality in the manufacturing sector. We introduce a labor subsidy
in manufacturing which distorts wages and shifts labor into this sector. We
show that the labor subsidy can accelerate the industrialization process in a
closed economy and that the welfare reducing distortions in the short run can
be outweighed by accelerated growth in the long run.
In a small open economy, a labor subsidy can break the negative link between
agricultural productivity and growth. We find that industrialization in a small
open economy does not depend so much on comparative advantage as it does
on relative sectoral TFP growth.2 An economy industrializes when TFP in
the manufacturing sector grows faster than in the agricultural sector. If the
international relative price of the manufactured good is lower than a critical
price that we derive, a small open economy will deindustrialize. By increasing
the fraction of labor in manufacturing through the labor subsidy, a small open
economy can industrialize if the subsidy is larger than a critical subsidy that is
derived. The lower the international relative price of the manufactured good,
the higher the subsidy must be in order to lead to industrialization.
In order to analyze the effectiveness of the subsidy in leading to industrial-
ization, we examine different cases pertaining to different international relative
prices. If the critical price is very high relative to the international relative price
for the manufactured good, consumers can be better off by remaining closed to
trade. However, short run gains from trade may make an economy open up
for trade and deindustrialize. This might serve as an explanation why many
small open developing economies today are still specialized in agriculture. The
higher the rate of industrialization the lower the critical price of an economy.
Therefore, the critical price for a closed economy will tend to decrease over time.
When the critical price falls below the international relative price of the manu-
factured good, the small economy can open up for trade and industrialize. The
labor subsidy bridges the gap between the critical price and the international
price, such that a small economy can open up for trade and industrialize earlier.
We also apply the model to the case in which there are two large economies.
Comparative advantage determines which economy industrializes. Introducing a
labor subsidy has a strict negative effect on both the fraction of labor employed
2Dekle and Vandenbroucke (2012) and U¨ngo¨r (2009) argue that TFP growth differences
among sectors and the reduction of the relative size of the government are the main drivers
of structural transformation in China.
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in manufacturing and welfare in a country’s trade partner. We find a critical
subsidy that equalizes the fraction of labor employed in manufacturing in both
economies and which allows both economies to industrialize at the same time.
We show, using numerical simulations, that this subsidy can increase consumer
welfare in both countries compared to them being closed to trade.3 Therefore, a
subsidy used by a developing country can make up for welfare losses of exporting
the low-growth good.
Our paper is related to existing literature that examines the role of trade in
industrialization. Teignier (2014) analyzes how agricultural protectionist poli-
cies hindered structural transformation in countries with a comparative advan-
tage in manufacturing. Our model introduces a labor subsidy that allows an
economy with a comparative advantage in agriculture to industrialize. Chang
et al. (2006) use taxation for infrastructure investment and shows that high
agricultural productivity can generate a positive growth effect via increased tax
revenue. This revenue is then used for infrastructure investment that can po-
tentially turn a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing into a comparative
advantage by increasing manufacturing productivity. We apply the tax revenue
mechanism introduced by Chang et al. (2006) but instead of tax revenue being
spent on infrastructure, we examine the use of industrial policy by assuming tax
revenue is used to subsidize the cost of labor employed in the manufacturing
sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a closed economy and
analyzes welfare effects when a labor subsidy is introduced. Section 3 describes
a small open economy and analyzes the relationship between the subsidy that
maximizes long run welfare and the international relative price of the manufac-
tured good. Section 4 then introduces two large open economies which differ in
their initial labor productivity in the manufacturing sector. Section 5 concludes
with policy recommendations and final remarks.
2 The Closed Economy
2.1 Supply Side
We consider a two-sector economy that produces a manufactured good, YMt ,
and an agricultural good, Y At , at time t. Labor is the only factor of production
and its total supply is normalized to one. The production functions for both
sectors are given by
YMt = MtF (nt) = Mt(nt)
α (1)
3In a model of endogenous growth and international trade between two large economies,
Redding (1999) finds that both countries can benefit in the long run from an economy using
subsidies to enter sectors in which it has no initial comparative advantage but higher learning-
by-doing potential than the trade partner. We show that it can benefit both countries with
equal learning-by-doing potential if a subsidy allows both trade partners to industrialize.
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and
Y At = AtG(1− nt) = At(1− nt)α, (2)
where nt is the fraction of labor employed in the manufacturing sector and
TFP in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors are given by At and Mt,
respectively. We assume 0 < α < 1 so that both sectors are characterized by
diminishing returns to scale as in Matsuyama (1992). TFP in the agricultural
sector, representing factors such as better fertilizers or level of technology, is
assumed to grow at a constant exogenous rate,
gA =
A˙t
At
. (3)
Manufacturing TFP, representing endogenous knowledge capital that accumu-
lates from experience in manufacturing, is assumed to increase in a process of
learning-by-doing. Therefore, the more labor employed in manufacturing, the
larger the increase in manufacturing TFP4,
M˙t = δY
M
t = δMt(nt)
α, (4)
so that
gMt =
M˙t
Mt
= δnαt , (5)
where gMt is the growth rate of manufacturing TFP at time t and δ > 0 is the
asymptotic upper limit as n approaches 1. As it is commonly assumed, there
are complete knowledge spillovers within the manufacturing sector so all firms
share the same TFP level.
Profits in the agricultural sector are
piAt = At(1− nt)α − wAt (1− nt), (6)
where wAt is the wage in the agricultural sector and the price of the agricultural
good serves as the numeraire. Profits in the manufacturing sector are
piMt = ptMt(nt)
α − wMt nt(1− s), (7)
where wMt is the wage in the manufacturing sector, s is a proportional labor
subsidy given by the government, and pt is the price of the manufactured good
relative to the agricultural good. The labor subsidy is the only choice variable
of the government which is introduced at t = 0 and is assumed to remain
constant over time. By reducing the labor costs in the manufacturing sector,
the subsidy increases the demand for labor in the manufacturing sector relative
4We follow Matsuyama (1992) and Chang et al. (2006) in our formulation for the growth
rate of manufacturing TFP. The growth rate depends on total output in the manufacturing
sector. Matsuyama (1992) shows that the inclusion of capital as a factor input does not change
the results of the model.
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to the agricultural sector. The first-order conditions in the agricultural sector
and the manufacturing sector are
αAt(1− nt)α−1 − wA = 0 (8)
and
αptMt(nt)
α−1 − wM (1− s) = 0, (9)
respectively. To pay for the subsidy, the government taxes household income
which is composed of both firm profits and wages. The tax revenue collected at
time t, TRt, is equal to
TRt = τt
[
At(1− nt)α + ptMtnαt + swMt nt
]
, (10)
where τt is the tax rate at time t needed to fund a subsidy of s. Government
revenue is only spent on the labor subsidy, swMt nt, which combined with (10)
gives us the government budget constraint,
TRt = sw
M
t nt, (11)
τt =
swMt nt
At(1− nt)α + ptMtnαt + swMt nt
. (12)
2.2 Demand Side
We assume that a representative consumer has Stone-Geary preferences given
by
Ut = γ log (c
A
t − c¯A) + (1− γ) log cMt , (13)
where consumption of the agricultural and manufactured good at time t are
represented by cAt and c
M
t , respectively, and c¯
A > 0 represents the subsistence
level, or the minimum requirement, of agricultural consumption. In order to
guarantee that the subsistence level of agricultural consumption is met for the
whole population, we assume that A0 > c¯
A > 0. With non-homothetic pref-
erences, the income elasticity of demand for the agricultural good is less than
unitary and the share of income spent on the manufactured good increases as
disposable income increases.
As in Boldrin and Scheinkman (1988) and Echevarria (1997), we assume no
borrowing constraints such that consumers spend all their disposable income,
It, on consumption of the two goods,
It = (1− τt)
(
At(1− nt)α + ptMtnαt + swtnt
)
. (14)
From the maximization problem, we derive the following demands for each good:
cMt = (1− γ)
(It − c¯A)
pt
(15)
and
cAt = γIt + (1− γ)c¯A. (16)
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2.3 Equilibrium
The goods market clearing conditions are
YMt = c
M
t (17)
and
Y At = c
A
t . (18)
Using equations (8), (9), and the non-arbitrage condition in the labor market,
wMt = w
A
t , we can derive the relative supply in terms of pt and nt:
pt = (1− s) At
Mt
(
nt
1− nt
)1−α
. (19)
First, consider an economy in autarky with homothetic preferences (c¯A = 0).
From (15) and (16), the relative demand for the manufactured good can be found
in terms of pt,
pt =
1− γ
γ
cAt
cMt
=
1− γ
γ
At
Mt
(
1− nt
nt
)α
. (20)
Equalizing (19) and (20) will lead to the fraction of labor employed in the
manufacturing sector,
n =
1− γ
1− γs , (21)
which is constant over time when preferences are homothetic. The subsidy only
has a level effect on the fraction of labor employed in manufacturing but does
not change over time as shown in Figure 1 for different subsidy rates.
The TFP growth rates, gA and gM , determine if the relative price of the
manufactured good shrinks or grows over time. Since the subsidy increases the
fraction of labor employed in manufacturing, and therefore increases gMt ,
∂pt
∂s
< 0. (22)
Now consider an economy with non-homothetic preferences (c¯A > 0). The
higher the level of consumer income, the higher the relative demand for the
manufactured good causing labor to shift into the manufacturing sector over
time. In the long run, manufacturing TFP will grow faster as the fraction of
labor employed in this sector increases while agricultural TFP growth remains
constant. As in Matsuyama (1992), closed developing economies with higher
agricultural productivity will industrialize faster than economies with smaller
agricultural productivity.
Rewriting (21) with non-homothetic preferences gives
nt =
(1− γ)(It − c¯A)
It − sγ(It − c¯A)− sc¯A . (23)
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Figure 1: Fraction of Labor in Manufacturing in a Closed Economy under Ho-
mothetic Preferences
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The labor subsidy distorts wages, leading to a suboptimal allocation of labor
between the two sectors. However, the increase in nt leads to faster TFP growth
in the manufacturing sector. Figure 2 shows the level of industrialization over
time for different subsidy rates.
Figure 2: Fraction of Labor in Manufacturing in a Closed Economy under Non-
Homothetic Preferences
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A subsidy will lead to a fall in the relative price of the manufactured good
and increase the relative consumption of the manufactured good. The distorted
consumption of the two goods will decrease consumer welfare in the short run.
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Figure 3: Change in Welfare in a Closed Economy with Non-Homothetic Pref-
erences
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The Y-axis represents compensating variation. Positive values stand for the amount of income
consumers can give up for reaching utility levels without a subsidy. Therefore, positive values
represent welfare gains. By combining equations (13), (15) and (16), we solve for income
level (It(s)) necessary for acquiring consumer utility (Ut(s = 0)) without subsidy. Com-
pensating Variation equals the difference between income levels with and without subsidy
(CVt = It(s;Ut(s = 0)) − It(s = 0)). The X-axis represents time and the Z-axis represents
different subsidy rates.
In the long run, the initial increase in labor in the manufacturing sector
leads to an accelerated industrialization process. Due to the learning-by-doing
externality, labor productivity in the manufacturing sector will grow faster with
a larger subsidy. The increase in consumption of the manufactured good exceeds
the fall in consumption of the agricultural good in the long run. Figure 3
shows how consumer utility changes over time for different subsidy As Figure 3
suggests, there exists an optimal subsidy that maximizes consumer utility over
a given range. We define long run welfare as the sum of discounted consumer
utility (shown for a continuum of subsidy rates in Figure 4). The stronger the
learning-by-doing effect, represented by δ, the higher the optimal subsidy. The
higher the subsistence level of the agricultural good consumption, the lower the
initial share of labor employed in manufacturing and the larger the gains in
consumer welfare from the optimal subsidy.
3 Small Open Economy
In this section, the effects of a labor subsidy in the manufacturing sector are
analyzed for a small open economy. In the long run, a comparative advantage
in manufacturing can develop from an initial comparative disadvantage. As will
be shown, there is an additional channel in the form of reduced gains from trade
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Figure 4: Change in Sum of Discounted Consumer Utility in a Closed Economy
with Non-Homothetic Preferences
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The Y-axis represents the discounted consumer utility in percent compared to the no subsidy
case. Consumer Utility from equation (13) is discounted by five percent (DU = 0.95t−1Ut).
The X-axis represents different subsidy rates.
in which the subsidy can reduce welfare.
In a classical framework, international trade tends to reallocate resources
towards the sector in which a country has a comparative advantage. In contrast
to a closed economy, high agricultural productivity can lead to deindustrializa-
tion as shown in Matsuyama (1992). Thus, opening up to trade can reduce TFP
growth.
3.1 Equilibrium
Consider a SOE which differs from the rest of the world in agricultural and
manufacturing TFP, A∗ and M∗, respectively. The ratio of these parameters
will determine the international relative price of the manufactured good, p∗,
which is assumed to be constant and is taken as given by the SOE. Labor is
assumed to be immobile across countries and there are no learning-by-doing
spillovers across economies as in Matsuyama (1992), Redding (1999) and Young
(1991). Facing an constant, exogenous price5, the allocation of labor is such
that p∗ equals the marginal rate of transformation. Taking the international
relative price of the manufactured good as given,
p∗ = (1− s) At
Mt
(
nt
1− nt
)1−α
, (24)
5The model was also derived with an international price that declines at an exogenous rate
over time due to the learning-by-doing process in the rest of the world. The derivation can
be found in the Appendix.
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determines the allocation of labor between sectors, nt. Since
nt
1−nt is increas-
ing in nt, the fraction of labor employed in manufacturing will increase as the
subsidy increases, ceretis paribus. Rearranging (24), we find that
nt =
(p∗Mt)
1
1−α
((1− s)At) 11−α + (p∗Mt) 11−α
. (25)
Combining (3) and (25), manufacturing TFP will grow faster the larger the
subsidy
δgMt
δs
=
αδ
[
1 + (At(1− s)) 11−α + (p∗Mt) 1α−1
]−1−α
(1− α)(1− s)
(
At(1− s)
p∗Mt
) 1
1−α
> 0. (26)
However, a subsidy might not always be sufficiently high to increase nt over
time. From (25), the percentage change of the fraction of labor employed in
manufacturing depends on the difference in TFP growth rates in both sectors,
n˙t
nt
=
(
1
1− α
)(
1− nt
)[
M˙t
Mt
− A˙t
At
]
. (27)
Home will have a constant fraction of labor employed in manufacturing if TFP
in the manufacturing sector grows at an equal rate as in the agricultural sector.
In this scenario, the economy will have a constant fraction of labor employed in
manufacturing iff the following is satisfied:
n˜ =
(
gA
δ
) 1
α
, (28)
where n˜ is the critical fraction of labor employed in manufacturing such that
n˙t = 0. Combining (24) and (28) and setting s = 0, we find
p˜t =
(
At
Mt
)[(
δ
gA
) 1
α
− 1
]α−1
, (29)
where p˜t is the critical international relative price of the manufactured good
needed for the fraction of labor employed in manufacturing to remain constant
(n˙ = 0). If the international price is larger than the critical price (p∗ > p˜t) when
opening up for trade at t, the fraction of labor in manufacturing will grow over
time (n˙ > 0) and the economy will industrialize. If the international price is
smaller than the critical price (p∗ < p˜t), the fraction of labor in manufacturing
decreases (n˙ < 0) and the economy deindustrializes.
The higher the TFP in manufacturing relative to TFP in agriculture, the
smaller the critical price when opening up at time t and the more likely a small
economy will industrialize when opening up for trade. However, a comparative
advantage in manufacturing is not a necessary condition for industrialization.
Assume a small closed economy with the relative price of the manufactured
good pAt in autarky (19). Due to non-homothetic preferences, the economy
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Figure 5: Fraction of Labor in Manufacturing Equilibrium Path when pAt <
p∗ < p˜t
- t
6
n
n0
n1
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t1
Initially, the small closed economy industrializes. At t1 the economy opens for trade and starts
exporting manufacturing goods. There is a positive shock to labor in the manufacturing
sector. Since the international relative price is lower than the critical price, the economy
deindustrializes over time.
will industrialize. If the international relative price of the manufactured good
is larger than the autarky relative price (p∗ > pAt ), the small economy has a
comparative advantage in manufacturing and will export that good leading to
a jump in the fraction of labor employed in manufacturing. However, if the
international relative price of the manufactured good is smaller than the critical
price, the economy will then deindustrialize over time after the initial jump as
shown in Figure 5. This is due to the fact that TFP in the manufacturing sector
will grow slower relative to the agricultural sector. In the long run, the small
open economy loses its comparative advantage in manufacturing and will start
exporting the agricultural good. Therefore, a small open economy can export
the manufactured good but deindustrialize iff pAt < p
∗ < p˜t. On the other hand,
a small economy that opens up for trade and has a comparative advantage
in agriculture (p∗ < pAt ) will export the agricultural good. There is a negative
shock to the share of labor in the manufacturing sector and TFP growth declines
in the short run. However, if the international relative price of the manufactured
good is larger than the critical price, the economy will industrialize over time as
shown in Figure 6. Though exporting the agricultural good, TFP growth in the
manufacturing sector will grow faster relative to the agricultural sector and the
small open economy will acquire a comparative advantage in manufacturing and
begin exporting the manufactured good in the long run. Therefore, a small open
economy can begin exporting the agricultural good yet industrialize iff p˜t < p
∗ <
pAt . A small open economy will export the manufactured (agricultural) good and
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Figure 6: Fraction of Labor in Manufacturing Equilibrium Path when p˜t < p
∗ <
pAt
- t
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Initially, the small closed economy industrializes. At t1 the economy opens for trade and starts
exporting the agricultural good. There is a negative shock to labor in the manufacturing
sector. Since the international relative price is higher than the critical price, the economy
industrializes over time.
(de)industrialize, iff both the autarky price and critical price are smaller (larger)
than the international relative price of the manufactured good, respectively, as
shown in Figures 7 and 8.
3.2 Subsidy in a Small Open Economy
If the international relative price of the manufactured good is smaller than
the critical price (p∗ < p˜t), it would need to introduce a subsidy in order to
industrialize. The government can choose a subsidy that sets the initial fraction
of labor employed in manufacturing such that TFP grows at an equal rate in
both sectors. Combining equations (28) and (24), we solve for this critical
subsidy,
s˜t = 1− p∗Mt
At
[(
δ
gA
) 1
α
− 1
]1−α
= 1− p
∗
p˜t
. (30)
If an economy sets the labor subsidy lower than the critical subsidy (s < s˜t),
labor shifts from the manufacturing into the agricultural sector over time and
TFP growth declines in manufacturing. If an economy sets the subsidy above
the critical subsidy (s > s˜t), labor shifts into the manufacturing sector over time,
TFP growth in manufacturing increases and consumer welfare can increase in
the long run. In order to determine the optimal subsidy, we consider the previous
cases and analyze the welfare implications.
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Figure 7: Fraction of Labor in Manufacturing Equilibrium Path when pAt , p˜t <
p∗
- t
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Initially, the small closed economy industrializes. At t1 the economy opens for trade and starts
exporting the manufactured good. There is a positive shock to labor in the manufacturing
sector. Since the international relative price is larger than the critical price, the economy
industrializes over time.
Figure 8: Fraction of Labor in Manufacturing Equilibrium Path when p∗ <
pAt , p˜t
- t
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Initially, the small closed economy industrializes. At t1 the economy opens for trade and starts
exporting the agricultural good. There is a negative shock to labor in the manufacturing
sector. Since the international relative price is smaller than the critical price, the economy
deindustrializes over time.
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Figure 9: Fraction of Labor in Manufacturing with International Relative Price
equal Critical Price
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3.2.1 International Relative Price Equals the Critical Price
When opening up for trade, if Home faces an international relative price which
is equal to the critical price (p∗ = p˜t), the fraction of labor in manufacturing
remains constant (n˙ = 0) without subsides as shown in Figure 9. Here, the
critical subsidy is equal to zero (s˜t = 0). In order to industrialize, labor in
the manufacturing sector must be subsidized. Tax distortions reduce consumer
utility, such that consumers may be worse of in the short run. However, the
TFP growth in the manufacturing sector will increase real income in the long
run. Consumer welfare (in form of compensating variation) is shown over time
in Figure 10a. The sum of discounted consumer utility and the optimal subsidy,
defined by the subsidy that maximizes the sum of discounted utility for a range
of time is greater than zero, are shown in Figure 10b.
3.2.2 International Relative Price smaller than Critical Price
When opening up for trade, if Home faces an international relative price which is
smaller than the critical price (p∗ < p˜t), the economy will tend to deindustrialize
over time. Opening up the economy will shift labor into the agricultural sector
and reduce the growth rate of TFP in the manufacturing sector. TFP growth
declines and, eventually, consumer welfare will be less than in a closed economy.
In the long run, consumers may be worse off as shown in Figure 11.
Equation (30) shows that the smaller the ratio between the international
relative price and the closed economy relative price of the manufactured good,
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Figure 10: SOE with International Relative Price equal Critical Price
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(a) Consumption Variation
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(b) Discounted Consumer Utility
Figure 11: Consumer Utility in a Closed and Open Economy
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Figure 12: Labor Allocation in a SOE With International Relative Price smaller
than Critical Price
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(a) p∗ << p˜t
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(b) p∗ < p˜t
the larger the subsidy needed to industrialize (compare Figures 12a and 12b)
and the larger the distortions generated. A small subsidy will only result in
decelerating the deindustrialization process. If the critical subsidy ends up being
very large, positive TFP growth effect might not outweigh the distortionary
effect in the long run (see Figure 13a) and the optimal subsidy will be zero
(Figure 14a). Therefore, consumers might be better served by remaining in a
closed economy.
The smaller the difference between the international relative price and the
critical price, the smaller is the subsidy needed to industrialize. Negative short
run income effects will be smaller and can be outweighed by positive TFP growth
effect (see Figure 13b). In that case, the optimal subsidy will be greater than
zero as shown in Figure 14b. Therefore, countries that are not very developed
relative to the rest of the world are less likely to benefit from industrial policy.
3.2.3 International Relative Price larger than Critical Price
When opening up for trade, if Home faces an international relative price which
is larger than the critical price (p∗ > p˜t), labor will shift into the manufacturing
sector and Home benefits from both gains from trade and TFP growth. A
labor subsidy can accelerate industrialization (see Figures 15a and 15b) and
can lead to welfare gains in the long run (see Figures 16a and 16b). The higher
the international relative price of the manufactured good, the higher the initial
fraction of labor in manufacturing and the faster the rate of TFP growth in
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Figure 13: Compensating Variation in a SOE With International Relative Price
smaller than Critical Price
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Figure 14: Discounted Consumer Utility in a SOE International Relative Price
smaller than Critical Price
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Figure 15: Labor Allocation in a SOE With International Relative Price larger
than Critical Price
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(a) p∗ > p˜t
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(b) p∗ >> p˜t
the manufacturing sector. Therefore, the labor subsidy can lose some of their
their efficiency as the upper bound of the fraction of labor in manufacturing is
reached (see Figures 17a and 17b).
3.3 Policy Implications
We have shown that the optimal subsidy is dependent on the international
relative price. A labor subsidy is most effective when the international relative
price of the manufactured good equals the critical price. The higher the price
is above the critical price, the smaller the positive impact of the subsidy on
welfare. The lower the price is below the critical price, the larger the subsidy
would have to be and, therefore, the larger the distortions created which reduce
welfare.
Historically, it has been shown that the international relative price of the
manufactured good has been increasing over time relative to the agricultural
good, thereby supporting the Prebisch-Singer thesis that countries who export
primary goods will have terms of trade that decline over time. In order for a SOE
to avoid deteriorating terms of trade, it has been argued that industrialization
is necessary. The long-term negative growth effects from trade may outweigh
the short-term gains from trade. Using a subsidy with free trade would result
in very large distortions. This can explain why many developing economies are
still exporters of primary goods. An economy might have opened up too early
if short run gains from trade were favored over long run economic development.
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Figure 16: Compensating Variation in a SOE With International Relative Price
larger than Critical Price
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Figure 17: Discounted Consumer Utility in a SOE International Relative Price
larger than Critical Price
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Furthermore, industrializing with a subsidy can incur large welfare losses in the
short run. The more time spent on specializing in agriculture, the larger the
comparative advantage in that sector and the harder it becomes to justify the
use of a subsidy as a mean of industrialization later on.
If the international relative price is not too distant from the critical price, a
labor subsidy can bridge this gap while increasing consumer welfare over the long
run. If the critical price is sufficiently low such that Home industrializes with free
trade, the subsidy becomes less efficient but can accelerate the industrialization
process and might be welfare enhancing.
To briefly summarize, the decision to open up for trade and the optimal labor
subsidy depend on the economy’s development relative to the rest of the world.
In an earlier stage of economic development, countries might need an appropri-
ate amount of catching-up in manufacturing TFP without trade. Equation (29)
shows that the smaller the TFP ratio between the agricultural and manufac-
turing sector, the smaller the critical price and, thus, the smaller the subsidy
needed to lead to industrialization. Therefore, the labor subsidy can be used as
an instrument that allows small economies to industrialize faster without trade,
allowing for some catch-up, before finally opening up their economies.
4 Two Large Countries
Next, we look at the effects of a labor subsidy when there are only two large
economies. We assume the population of both economies are of equal size and
they only differ in their relative initial TFP, A0M0 . With free trade, the relative
international price is such that world markets for both goods clear. We will
introduce a labor subsidy in one economy, the one with a comparative advantage
in agriculture, and analyze how this affects welfare in both countries.
Assume that the initial productivity of the two countries, referred to Home
and Foreign, satisfy the following conditions:
M0
A0
<
M∗0
A∗0
, (31)
where M0 and A0 are the initial total factor productivities in Home and M
∗
0
and A∗0 are the initial productivities in Foreign. By opening up for trade, the
relative price of the manufactured good will decrease at Home which will re-
duce the fraction of labor employed in manufacturing. Short run welfare gains
from trade can be outweighed by the negative effects on lower TFP growth in
the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, Foreign experiences a positive
shock as the fraction of labor in manufacturing increases which leads to faster
industrialization.
By introducing a subsidy as in the previous section, Home can shift labor into
the manufacturing sector (see Figure 18a). Home’s use of a subsidy negatively
affects the terms of trade in Foreign as it reduces the relative international
price of the manufactured good. This leads to a reduction in the share of
workers in manufacturing in Foreign (see Figure 18b). As before, introducing
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Figure 18: Labor Allocation in the Two-Country Case
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a labor subsidy at Home has negative welfare effects in the short run due to
the distortions created, however, the negative impact is reduced by an increase
in Home’s terms of trade. In the long run, Home might benefit from a labor
subsidy that at the very least will decelerate the deindustrialization process (see
Figure 19a and 20a). A subsidy at Home will always reduce welfare in Foreign
(see Figure 19b and 20b). In the short run, the subsidy reduces Foreign’s terms
of trade and, in the long run, will also reduce their TFP growth as n∗t will be
lower.
However, Foreign might also industrialize in the short run before deindus-
trializing as shown in Figure 18b. In this case, TFP growth rate is higher in
Home (gMt > g
M∗
t ) while the change in manufacturing TFP is higher in Foreign
(M˙∗t > M˙t). Therefore, the fraction of labor in manufacturing in Foreign is
growing at time t as long as the following condition is satisfied:(
nt
n∗t
)α
<
M∗t
Mt
, (32)
where nt and n
∗
t are the fractions of labor employed in manufacturing in Home
and Foreign at time t, respectively.
If Home sets its subsidy such that the initial fraction of labor in manufactur-
ing in both economies are equal (nt = n
∗
t ), it will be possible for both economies
to industrialize. The manufacturing productivity in both economies will grow
at the same rate and eventually converge diminishing trade. By combining and
equalizing the fractions of labor employed in manufacturing in both countries,
we find the unique subsidy
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Figure 19: Welfare Development in the Two-Country Case
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Figure 20: Discounted Consumer Utility in the Two-Country Case
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Figure 21: Discounted Consumer Utility in Home and Foreign
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, (33)
which allows both countries to industrialize in the long run.
Since both economies industrialize at the same time while still benefiting
from trade in the short run, the unique subsidy may be optimal in that both
economies are better off than without trade. Figure 21 compares the discounted
consumer utility of both economies between autarky and free trade with a sub-
sidy in Home. We find that consumer utility in both countries is higher when
both countries trade with the unique subsidy compared to remain closed off to
trade.
This gives interesting insight into policy implications. a Labor subsidy in
manufacturing should not be used as an instrument for protectionism but rather
for a cooperative international policy for developing countries. It can be shown
that free trade is a weakly dominant strategy relative to autarky for an indus-
trialized country even if the developing country makes use of a labor subsidy.
Our model also shows that an industrialized economy can even benefit from a
labor subsidy implemented in the less developed economy if this were to lead to
the opening of trade. 6
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a two-sector model of endogenous growth with
learning-by-doing in the manufacturing sector. It is assumed that manufactur-
6These findings are robust in our model using different parameter values.
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ing TFP growth increases with the amount of labor in the manufacturing sector.
The labor subsidy shifts labor into this sector, accelerating the industrialization
process in a closed economy. However, tax distortions will reduce consumer
welfare in the short run. In a small open economy (SOE) we find that indus-
trialization does not depend on comparative advantage but on relative sectoral
TFP growth relative to the free trade price. By shifting labor into the manu-
facturing sector, the labor subsidy can lead to industrialization. However, the
greater the difference between the international relative price of the manufac-
tured good and the critical price derived, the less efficient a subsidy becomes.
In a case of two large countries, we determine a unique subsidy that can ensure
that both economies industrialize.
We have shown that a labor subsidy can be used to support industrializa-
tion in developing economies. This can be mutually beneficial for consumer
welfare in both the subsidized economy and its trade partners. Therefore, our
model suggests that developed economies might have an interest in supporting
industrialization policies in developing countries if it would lead to open trade.
Further research should analyze under which conditions the labor subsidy in
the less developed economy improves long run consumer welfare of both trade
partners.
Results in this paper must be interpreted with caution. The assumption
of no knowledge spillovers across economies simplifies the model but might
not hold true. Furthermore, we assumed exogenous agricultural productivity
growth which means that agricultural innovations associated with industrial-
ization (agricultural machinery, chemical innovations, etc.) cannot be assessed.
We also exclude capital accumulation and financial markets to make the model
tractable. Nevertheless, the paper highlights, in a simple framework, the role
a labor subsidy can play for economic development. If agents are sufficiently
patient, the subsidy can have a long run positive impact on the structural com-
position and economic performance of developing economies that can exceed
short run costs.
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Appendix A Dynamic International Price
Here we show that the results of the SOE model are not affected by an inter-
national price that declines over time. If we assume that the learning-by-doing
externality increases labor productivity in the manufacturing sector relative to
the agricultural sector, the international price p∗t declines at a constant exoge-
nous rate gp∗ . Taking into account a dynamic international price, the percentage
change in the fraction of labor employed in manufacturing derived in equation
(27) can be rearranged into
n˙t
nt
=
(
1
1− α
)(
1− nt
)[
M˙t
Mt
− A˙t
At
+
p˙∗t
p∗t
]
, (34)
where
p˙∗t
p∗t
is equal to the constant rate gp∗ at which the international price
declines over time (note that gp∗ < 0). If we set the change in the fraction
of labor in manufacturing equal to zero, we can derive the critical price from
equation (34)
p˜t =
(
At
Mt
)[(
δ
gA − gp∗
) 1
α
− 1
]α−1
. (35)
The critical price becomes larger due to the dynamic international price. There-
fore, TFP in manufacturing relative to TFP in agriculture must be higher for
a SOE to industrialize compared to the case of a constant international price.
The larger the critical price, the larger the critical subsidy in equation (30). We
derive the critical subsidy by combining equations (35) and (24),
s˜t = 1− p∗Mt
At
[(
δ
gA − gp∗
) 1
α
− 1
]1−α
. (36)
The critical subsidy increases with the rate of change of the international price.
Therefore, a SOE may have to introduce a larger subsidy in order to industrialize
compared to the constant international price case. The function of the subsidy
as an instrument that allows earlier opening up for trade while industrializing
still applies.
Appendix B Parameters
Most parameters are derived from data in Kendrick (1961) which has values for
the U.S. for the first half of the 20th century. U.S. trade during this time is
lowest, relative to GDP, in which sectoral data is available and therefore the
closest proxy to a closed economy. First, we use output and TFP data from
1953 relative to 1899 to calculate average annual growth rates of output and
TFP. The average annual growth rates of fraction of labor in each sector is
calculated by using data on distribution of persons engaged by sector from 1899
to 1957. We solve for α in each sector in equations (1) and (2), by subtracting
the the annual growth rate of TFP from the annual growth rate of output and
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divide by the annual growth rate of the fraction of labor. The average from
both sectors is the parameter α in our simulation. We use Gross Value Added
data, distribution of persons engaged for each sector in 1929 and α to derive
TFP in both sectors following the same equations. We derive gA by using the
annual growth rate of TFP in agriculture from 1899 to 1953. The value of our
learning-by-doing externality is calculated by using the annual growth rate of
TFP, the distribution of persons engaged in the manufacturing sector and α.
In order to derive γ, we use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We
divided the sum of Food and Beverages purchased for off-premises consumption
and Food Services by Personal Consumption Expenditures in 2014 to calcu-
late γ. From equation (16) we derive c¯A with total consumption expenditures
and consumption expenditures spent on the agricultural good data from 1929
(Carter et al. (2006)).
Table 1: Parameter Table
Parameter Value Source
M0 729.96 Kendrick (1961): manufacturing TFP in U.S. in 1929
A0 64.14 Kendrick (1961): agricultural TFP in the U.S. in
1929
α 0.9 Kendrick (1961); derived from the average annual
growth rate of TFP and output from 1899 to 1953
and average change of labor from 1899 to 1957 in
agriculture and manufacturing in the U.S.
gA 0.0133 Kendrick (1961): average annual growth rate of agri-
cultural TFP from 1899 to 1953 in the U.S.
δ 0.0336 Kendrick (1961): learning-by-doing externality in
manufacturing from 1899 to 1953 in the U.S.
γ 0.138 Bureau of Economic Analysis: Share of Personal
Consumption Expenditures spent on the agricultural
good in the U.S in 2014
c¯A 12.19 Carter et al. (2006): subsistence level of agricultural
consumption in the U.S. in 1929
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